{"resource":"https://rs-nz-payments.demo.cba.raidiam.io","resource_name":"ASB New Zealand Payments","resource_documentation":"https://rs-nz-payments.demo.cba.raidiam.io/","authorization_servers":["https://asb.demo.cba.raidiam.io"],"bearer_methods_supported":["header"],"scopes_supported":["openid","nz.payments"],"authorization_details_types_supported":["nz_payment"],"dpop_signing_alg_values_supported":["ES256"],"dpop_bound_access_tokens_required":false,"tls_client_certificate_bound_access_tokens":false,"cba_resource_profile":{"profile_version":"1.0","treatment":"CBA side illustration, not a Raidiam product","operator":"Commonwealth Bank business banking, illustrative reference model","domain":"accounts payable","summary":"Lists saved payees and initiates a New Zealand dollar payment, under the ASB platform and New Zealand rules. A separate jurisdiction with its own authorisation server.","read_only":false,"dpop_binding":{"mode":"bound","description":"This resource verifies a DPoP proof whenever one is presented, and requires one whenever the access token carries a cnf.jkt claim. Plain bearer tokens are still accepted while the authorization server is being moved onto sender constrained tokens."},"trust":{"authorization_server":"https://asb.demo.cba.raidiam.io","trust_anchor":"https://authority.directory.cba.raidiam.io/authority/5a27c88b-97ed-4d37-a3c8-59c66b19aa25","federation_required":true,"description":"The authorization server named above is trusted only while it resolves to the federation trust anchor named here. The chain is walked and each subordinate statement verified before any token is accepted."},"authorization_details_profiles":[{"type":"nz_payment","title":"New Zealand payment initiation","description":"Authority to initiate a payment in New Zealand dollars to a saved payee, under the ASB platform.","actions":["read"],"required_members":["type","purpose"],"optional_members":[],"example":{"type":"nz_payment","purpose":"Settle a New Zealand supplier invoice"}}],"required_token_claims":[{"claim":"sub","required":true,"description":"The customer this authority was delegated over."},{"claim":"root_grant","required":false,"description":"The delegation this call belongs to, recorded on every decision."},{"claim":"act","required":false,"description":"The RFC 8693 actor chain, recorded on every decision."},{"claim":"cnf.jkt","required":false,"description":"The thumbprint of the key the access token is bound to."},{"claim":"authorization_details[nz_payment]","required":true,"description":"The authority this resource acts on."}],"policies":[{"id":"rs.authenticated_caller","title":"Every call carries a token from the named authorization server","statement":"Calls are accepted only with an access token issued by https://asb.demo.cba.raidiam.io and addressed to this resource as its audience. A token minted for a different resource is refused even when it is otherwise valid.","denial_reason":"missing_access_token, invalid_token","enforced_at":"authorization","remedy":"Read this metadata document, then request a token from the authorization server it names, with this resource as the audience."},{"id":"rs.authority_gate","title":"Authority is the RFC 9396 detail type, not a scope","statement":"Each tool names one authorization_details type. The token must carry that type, or an umbrella type that narrows to it. Holding a scope, or holding authority for a neighbouring resource, does not admit the call.","denial_reason":"insufficient_authority","enforced_at":"authorization","remedy":"Obtain a token carrying the detail type the tool names. Delegation only ever narrows, so the delegating envelope must already contain it."},{"id":"rs.revocation_honoured","title":"A revoked delegation stops working before its tokens expire","statement":"Revocation arrives as a Shared Signals event and is applied to the delegation, not to a single token. Every token issued under a revoked delegation is refused from that moment, whatever its expiry says.","denial_reason":"delegation_revoked","enforced_at":"authorization","remedy":"The customer must grant a fresh delegation. There is no way to appeal a revocation at the resource."},{"id":"rs.dpop_binding","title":"Sender constrained tokens are bound to the key that holds them","statement":"A DPoP proof is verified whenever one is presented, and is required whenever the access token names a key in its cnf.jkt claim. Each proof is accepted once, so a captured proof cannot be replayed.","denial_reason":"dpop_proof_required, invalid_dpop_proof, dpop_key_mismatch, dpop_proof_replayed, access_token_not_dpop_bound","enforced_at":"authorization","remedy":"Request the access token with a DPoP proof so the authorization server binds it to your key, then send a fresh proof with every call."},{"id":"rs.request_validity","title":"A malformed request is refused with the reason it was malformed","statement":"Arguments are validated before any business rule runs, and the refusal names the argument at fault rather than returning a bare failure.","denial_reason":"tool_error, invalid_amount, unknown_tool","enforced_at":"execution","remedy":"Correct the named argument. The tool schemas are published in this document."},{"id":"nz.jurisdiction_is_a_capability_type","title":"Australian payment authority is not New Zealand payment authority","statement":"This resource honours nz_payment and nothing else. An agent holding payment_initiation, however large its envelope, holds no authority here. The jurisdictional boundary is expressed in the capability vocabulary rather than left to deployment topology, so it is visible to a consumer before it calls.","denial_reason":"capability_denied","enforced_at":"authorization","remedy":"Obtain nz_payment authority from the ASB platform."},{"id":"nz.saved_payees_only","title":"Saved payees only","statement":"A payment can only be sent to a payee already saved on the account. An agent cannot introduce a new destination, which is the control that makes a compromised agent unable to redirect money.","denial_reason":"unknown_payee","enforced_at":"execution","remedy":"A new payee is added by a human in ASB FastNet."}],"tools":[{"name":"list_payees","description":"The saved New Zealand payees on this account.","required_authorization_details_type":"nz_payment","mutates":false,"http_endpoint":"https://rs-nz-payments.demo.cba.raidiam.io/api/list_payees","mcp_tool":"list_payees"},{"name":"initiate_nzd_payment","description":"Initiate a payment in New Zealand dollars to a saved payee.","required_authorization_details_type":"nz_payment","mutates":true,"http_endpoint":"https://rs-nz-payments.demo.cba.raidiam.io/api/initiate_nzd_payment","mcp_tool":"initiate_nzd_payment"}],"interfaces":{"mcp":{"transport":"streamable-http","endpoint":"https://rs-nz-payments.demo.cba.raidiam.io/mcp","description":"Model Context Protocol over Streamable HTTP. The same authority gate applies as on the HTTP endpoints."},"http":{"style":"json","endpoint_template":"https://rs-nz-payments.demo.cba.raidiam.io/api/{tool}","description":"A plain JSON twin of every tool, sharing one handler with the MCP surface."}},"observability":{"decisions_endpoint":"https://rs-nz-payments.demo.cba.raidiam.io/decisions","description":"The most recent admission decisions, allowed and refused, each carrying the policy that decided it and the values the decision turned on.","correlation":{"request_header":"x-correlation-id","also_accepted":["traceparent","access token correlation_id claim","access token txn claim"],"response_header":"x-correlation-id","echoed_in":["the response body of every allowed call","the body of every refusal","every decision log entry"],"lookup":"https://rs-nz-payments.demo.cba.raidiam.io/decisions?correlation_id={id}","description":"Send an identifier from whatever triggered the work and this resource records its decision under that identifier rather than minting its own. One id therefore runs from the trigger, through the token issued for it, to the decision made here, and the decisions taken under it can be read back in order."},"recorded_per_decision":["the correlation id and where it came from","the authorization server, the published key that verified the token, and whether that server was resolved to the configured federation trust anchor","the agent identity that made the call and the full delegation chain behind it, as asserted by the authorization server in the RFC 8693 act claim","the delegating customer and the root delegation","the authorization_details types held against the type the tool required","the outcome, and for a refusal the policy that decided it and the values it turned on"]}}}